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Afghanistan: Aid Without Accountability

Afghanistan: Aid Without Accountability
Afghanistan: Aid Without Accountability

 

By Ahan S. Prakash

 

There is a strange contradiction at the core of modern Eurasian diplomacy. Western governments and regional powers keep pumping money into Kabul, even though the current administration is openly protecting the same militant groups that threaten global security. It has been five years since Afghanistan’s republic fell apart in 2021. Since then, the Taliban have taken a shattered country and, instead of rebuilding it for its people, have turned it into a breeding ground for extremist networks that reach across borders. They manage this bizarre balancing act, stuck somewhere between medieval style tribalism and the slick money flows of modern crime. The ruling elite in Kandahar know exactly how to squeeze billions in aid from outside donors without giving way on basic things like human rights, inclusive government, or even keeping terrorist groups in check.

Look at the numbers and it is hard to shrug off what is happening. Afghanistan brings in something like 12 billion dollars in imports every year, but officially exports just 1.7 billion dollars. That leaves a gaping trade deficit, over 10 billion dollars. Given there is barely any industry to speak of and the country is landlocked, there is no legal way to close that gap through taxes. So, how do they do it? Since 2021, outside players have pumped in around 17.5 billion dollars in aid and humanitarian cash. Add in profits from drugs, smuggling, and illegal mining, and you start to see how the books are balanced, but it is anything but legitimate.

A lot of international donors like to think their money goes straight to ordinary Afghans in need, not to the regime itself. But that is more wishful thinking than fact. All that foreign currency stabilizes Afghanistan’s own currency and props up the government budget. That frees up homegrown revenue to fund a growing military. Since August 2021, international organizations, bankrolled by Western countries, have delivered 8 billion dollars in humanitarian aid, with another 3.78 billion dollars on the way and tens of millions more on the table. All this cash acts as a buffer, letting the Taliban send resources straight to militant allies, Al Qaeda, ETIM, ISIS K, TTP, the list goes on.

Foreign aid and humanitarian cash stabilize Afghanistan’s currency and prop up the government budget, freeing homegrown revenue to fund militant networks.

In the power circles of Kandahar, there is a dangerous belief that has really taken hold. Top leaders honestly see their decades long insurgency against the U.S. and NATO as a playbook for political victory, not just for them, but for extremists everywhere. So, instead of treating these violent groups as problems that might ruin their foreign ties, the Taliban offer them shelter and even help. These militants are not hiding. They are part of the local economy: extorting businesses, kidnapping for ransom, trafficking drugs. They know the Afghan authorities have their backs, so there is little risk in building up their networks.

Pakistan, in particular, has gone through every diplomatic hoop possible, testing its patience to the brink. For five years, Islamabad tried everything: seventeen rounds of top level talks, joint committees, security negotiations, the list is long and exhausting. These efforts were teamed with group talks in Doha, Istanbul, Riyadh, Urumqi, and through the China Pakistan Afghanistan trilateral framework. In 2023, Afghanistan’s foreign minister even promised to stop cross border attacks. But again and again, none of these promises held up.

The final straw? The eighth round of Moscow Format talks in October 2026. What began as a forum for finding a solution after the U.S. pulled out (following the Ukraine invasion) had turned into a tense ritual where everyone tried to get the Taliban to commit to fighting terrorism. During that eighth meeting, the Taliban delegation flat out refused to make any commitments or admit any responsibilities. That moment finally woke up powers like Moscow and Beijing, who had been banking on quiet deals to secure their own interests.

Keeping this regime afloat with endless infusions of cash is self sabotage on a global scale unless donors demand ironclad counterterrorism accountability.

Meanwhile, inside Afghanistan, the Taliban are reshaping society at the roots. Forget modern education or openness. Instead, they have built thousands of religious schools since taking over, and only a measly 269 modern schools. They kicked out 90,000 trained teachers, hiring about 100,000 clerics who toe the regime’s line. They scrapped 18 university majors, rewrote more than 200 courses, and banned nearly 700 textbooks. This is not a country preparing for peace or trade, it is one gearing up for a never ending struggle, both at home and abroad.

With all this in mind, the big dreams of linking South and Central Asia through Afghanistan are just that, dreams. Plans like the TAPI gas pipeline, CASA 1000 energy project, and the Trans Afghan Railway are little more than daydreams as long as Kabul backs terrorism. Money from illegal mines still flows straight into building up militant infrastructure. No investor, no bank, is going to commit to major projects in a territory controlled by warlords and funded by ransom and illegal mining.

It is time to face a harsh truth: keeping this regime afloat with endless infusions of cash does not help, it is self sabotage on a global scale. Donors who sign off on these checks now will be picking up the pieces later as militant networks spread across borders from their safe haven in Afghanistan. Unless global powers demand ironclad proof that every dollar is tied to genuine counterterrorism action, and until Kabul dismantles its militant sanctuaries, hopes for regional cooperation, new trade routes, or lasting peace will stay firmly out of reach.

 

About the Author

Ahan S. Prakash is a Geopolitical analyst and columnist covering South Asian affairs, strategic security, and international relations.