By Ketty L.
When a leader turns global diplomacy into a series of impulsive campaign stops, people around the world notice, and not always for good reasons. Take Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, for instance. Since October 2024, he’s basically been everywhere: flying across continents, meeting repeatedly with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, steering Indonesia into BRICS, brokering deals with Washington. At first glance, this whirlwind tour looks like a bold display of power. His supporters say it’s just Indonesia living up to its old “friend to all, enemy to none” mantra. But if you look past the glitzy photo ops, there’s a deeper problem. Indonesia’s foreign policy is shifting away from long term, institutional strategy, and toward the unpredictable kicks of a single man.
Let’s be real, this kind of personal, seat of the pants diplomacy has real financial, strategic, and institutional risks. Foreign policy’s not supposed to be a campaign rally; it’s about careful planning, following protocols, and sticking to strategies that outlast election cycles. When a president suddenly adds or cancels foreign visits with barely any notice, host governments scramble to adjust. Sure, everyone can smooth things over with formal diplomatic statements in the short term, but the real damage sneaks in quietly. Before long, other countries start to see Jakarta as unreliable. And in diplomacy, unpredictability makes partners cautious. If they think today’s handshake might be tossed aside by tomorrow’s impulsive order, they’re not going to risk much capital or goodwill.
We’re already seeing contradictions pile up. After pushing Indonesia into BRICS early in 2025, a group that’s increasingly hostile toward the West thanks to Moscow and Beijing, Prabowo’s government didn’t consult the experienced diplomats at the foreign ministry. The move came directly from the presidential palace. At almost the same time, Indonesia tried to cozy up with Washington, signing joint statements with Beijing that kind of nodded toward overlapping claims in the South China Sea. The result? Foreign diplomats are left with whiplash, scrambling to reconcile commitments that keep clashing because presidential instincts drive policy, not careful institutional review.
Indonesia’s foreign policy, by law, follows “Bebas dan Aktif” (Free and Active), a doctrine from 1948 meant to preserve independence and strategic autonomy, not to collect conflicting promises from every global capital. Balancing relationships with competing superpowers takes precise coordination. Every word in a joint statement needs expert review, so everyone understands the future impact. When the president makes promises on the spur of the moment, seasoned diplomats are left picking up the pieces, explaining to confused partners why Indonesia is agreeing with Washington one day and jumping into Beijing’s economic alliance the next.
Then there’s the money. This frantic travel schedule burns through huge amounts of state resources, from security to logistics. If all these trips just produce vague photo ops and no real bilateral deals or investment guarantees, taxpayers end up paying for little more than flashy gestures. Middle powers like Indonesia can’t afford to waste diplomatic or financial capital on hollow symbolism without substance.
The worst part, though, is what happens to state institutions. Foreign Minister Sugiono and Indonesia’s diplomatic corps have years of expertise. Their job is to shield national interests from political ups and downs, keeping things steady as administrations change. When the president sidelines them and makes decisions with only a small inner circle, the foreign ministry’s muscle starts to fade. Young diplomats learn that analysis matters less than getting close to the top. Over time, careful statecraft gets replaced by a reactive, improvisational style.
This hyper personal approach might work while Prabowo’s got the energy and connections to pull it off, but it leaves a fragile system behind. When he goes, the next president inherits a foreign service trained to chase rather than plan. History shows that after periods of centralized diplomacy, Indonesia needed decades to rebuild institutional strength once strong leaders stepped away.
Indonesia’s big ambitions, like mediating global conflicts in Gaza or dealing with Iran crisis fallout, require deep credibility and steady institutional focus. Real mediation isn’t about one big visit or a fiery speech at a summit. It’s slow, deliberate work by experts who understand legal, historical, and tactical layers of conflict. If the president tries to handle these disputes on the fly, without solid institutional support, the world sees it as PR, not actual diplomacy.
Indonesia’s got serious weight: fourth largest global population, biggest Southeast Asian economy, GDP over $1.3 trillion. The country deserves a leading seat at the international table. But real influence doesn’t come from a stack of passports or endless summits. It’s about the nation’s word, a consistent strategy, and strong public institutions. If Indonesia tries to be everywhere at once without solid backing, it risks being taken seriously nowhere.
If Indonesia wants to be a true leader for the Global South, it needs less impulsive whistle stops and more deliberate, patient statecraft. The president should let the diplomats do their jobs. Major shifts should be vetted with regional experts and economists, not tossed out on a whim. Careful groundwork and strategic negotiation might not grab headlines, but it build enduring power. Prabowo can stay the public face of Indonesian diplomacy, but he shouldn’t be its only engine. Diplomats and the world need a foreign policy rooted in process, not personality.
About the Author
Ketty L. is a Columnist writing on politics, international affairs, and global governance.