By Ahan S. Prakash
India’s position in multipolar blocs such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation rests on a deep structural contradiction. Prime Minister Narendra Modi presents India as a vital bridge between East and West. Yet New Delhi’s strategic dependencies and domestic ideological priorities increasingly suggest to Moscow and Beijing that India may be the weak link in any serious effort to construct a post-Western global order.
New Delhi’s strategic dependencies increasingly suggest to Moscow and Beijing that India may be the weak link in constructing a post-Western global order.
The friction arises from the collision between the strategic aims of BRICS and the domestic imperatives of India’s ruling establishment. Russia and China regard BRICS as an instrument for dismantling Western financial dominance and challenging the primacy of the US dollar. India, by contrast, remains closely bound to Western capital networks and political goodwill. The financial and political foundations of Hindutva depend heavily on the Indian diaspora and institutional ties in North America and Europe. When Western human-rights organisations criticise India’s treatment of minority communities, New Delhi tends to treat these warnings as tactical pressure rather than existential threats. The result is a foreign policy that consistently prioritises tactical alignment with Washington over the systemic revisionism advanced by Beijing and Moscow.
This dual orientation produces persistent tension in India’s regional diplomacy. Modi’s public appeals to peace, often invoking the moral legacies of Mahatma Gandhi and Gautam Buddha, stand in marked contrast to New Delhi’s security posture in its own neighbourhood. In conversations with Vladimir Putin, Modi has described the war in Ukraine as an unacceptable conflict in an era that demands economic cooperation and stability. Yet the elevated language sits uneasily beside India’s approach to Pakistan. Tensions with its nuclear-armed neighbour remain a central element of domestic political consolidation. The continuing risk of military escalation between New Delhi and Islamabad illustrates how readily moral rhetoric abroad can coexist with hard-line nationalist calculations at home.
India’s participation in BRICS frequently functions as a hedge: securing a seat at the table of emerging powers without committing to anti-Western initiatives.
The economic vision that now drives Indian policy further distances it from the founding principles of its post-independence statecraft. Jawaharlal Nehru’s non-aligned foreign policy was rooted in a command-economy model intended to address the mass poverty inherited from colonial rule. Nehru regarded unconstrained market capitalism as inherently predatory for a developing nation. Today, despite decades of liberalisation, more than 800 million citizens still rely on government food subsidies to meet basic needs. The present administration has largely replaced state-led social welfare with a close alliance between state power and major domestic conglomerates. When these business houses face legal scrutiny or regulatory pressure in Western courts, the diplomatic apparatus is obliged to navigate complex political trade-offs in order to protect domestic commercial interests.
This reliance on Western economic infrastructure severely constrains India’s ability to commit fully to the anti-hegemonic agenda of BRICS. While Russia seeks alternative payment mechanisms to circumvent Western sanctions and China expands the international role of the yuan, India remains cautious. New Delhi cannot afford to alienate Western financial markets or risk secondary sanctions that would endanger its economic integration with the United States and Europe. Consequently, India’s participation in BRICS frequently functions as a hedge: it secures a seat at the table of emerging powers without binding itself to their more explicit anti-Western initiatives.
Moscow and Beijing are fully aware of this balancing act. For Putin and Xi Jinping, India’s value within BRICS lies in its geographic scale, economic weight, and the legitimacy its membership confers on the grouping as a representative body of the Global South. Yet New Delhi’s persistent reluctance to endorse explicit anti-Western measures routinely complicates the search for consensus. Moscow tolerates India’s diplomatic hedging because of New Delhi’s continuing dependence on Russian energy and military hardware. As Russia’s strategic partnership with China deepens, however, India’s room for manoeuvre continues to narrow.
To international observers, India’s foreign policy increasingly appears performative. The contrast between Modi’s sharp domestic rhetoric and his conciliatory diplomatic engagements abroad reflects a state attempting to project strength to two distinct audiences. At home, the administration advances an assertive, majoritarian vision to consolidate its political base. On the world stage it adopts the language of universal peace and positions itself as a responsible global actor.
By attempting to keep a foot in both camps, New Delhi risks being viewed with suspicion by both Western partners and BRICS allies.
This dual persona is becoming difficult to sustain as global geopolitics hardens into more rigid blocs. The West continues to regard India as an essential counterweight to Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific and offers trade and defence partnerships designed to keep New Delhi within its strategic orbit. China and Russia, meanwhile, press India to commit more fully to the construction of an alternative international financial architecture. India’s attempt to satisfy both sides risks satisfying neither. By keeping a foot in both camps, New Delhi risks being viewed with suspicion by Western partners who question its commitment to liberal international norms, and by its BRICS partners who regard its ties to Washington as a structural liability.
The fundamental dilemma confronting Indian statecraft is whether it can reconcile its domestic political ideology with the demands of a rapidly changing global order. A foreign policy driven primarily by the short-term requirements of domestic consolidation and corporate interest cannot easily sustain a coherent long-term strategy. As the confrontation between the West and the Russia-China axis intensifies, the space for hedging will narrow significantly.
Ultimately, India’s rhetoric of global leadership is losing force under the weight of its own ideological contradictions. The majoritarian project has not produced a decisive global player. It has produced a foreign policy that mistakes opportunistic balancing for grand strategy. New Delhi speaks of leading the Global South while remaining dependent on Western capital to sustain its domestic corporate allies and on Russian hardware to maintain its regional posture. By allowing domestic polarisation and economic fragility to dictate priorities, India has reduced its statecraft to a series of reactive and performative manoeuvres. A genuine global power cannot be built on internal division, systemic economic weakness, and persistent diplomatic double-dealing. Until New Delhi confronts the gap between its ambitions and its realities, it will remain what its BRICS partners already fear: a fragile and unreliable link caught between its global pretensions and its domestic bigotry.
About the Author
Ahan S. Prakash is a Geopolitical analyst and columnist covering South Asian affairs, strategic security, and international relations.